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Unlike for the green party family, no empirically backed scholarly consensus exists about the grievances mobilized by populist right parties in Western Europe. To the contrary, three competing grievance mobilization models can be distinguished in the existing literature. These models focus on grievances arising from economic changes, political elitism and corruption, and immigration. This study discusses these three grievance mobilization models and tests them on comparable cross-sectional survey data for all seven relevant countries using multinomial probit analysis. The study finds that no populist right party performed well in elections around 2002 without mobilizing grievances over immigration. However, it finds several examples of populist right parties experiencing electoral success without mobilizing grievances over economic changes or political elitism and corruption. This study therefore solves a longstanding disagreement in the literature by showing in a comprehensive way that only the appeal on the immigration issue unites all successful populist right parties.
Introduction.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the electoral successes of populist right parties fundamentally altered the party systems of at least half of Western Europe's democracies. 1 It is therefore understandable that this group of parties has attracted widespread scholarly attention in comparative politics. However, in the literature a longstanding disagreement persists about what unites these parties across the different countries where they have risen to political influence. This study sorts out and seeks an empirical solution to this disagreement. It is argued that the debate began and became entrenched because the competing grievance mobilization models are all highly plausible on a theoretical level, and because the data previously available to test them was not sufficiently detailed, comprehensive, and comparable.
By contrast, this study does analyze data that enables rigorous tests of the competing claims put forward in the literature. This data, from the European Social Survey (2002/3), is ideally suited to establish what unites the populist right. This is so, firstly, because it is comprehensive so that the vote for all seven successful populist right parties can be examined in a strict comparative sense. Secondly, the survey is rich enough that all the grievance mobilization propositions can be tested in one multivariate model. This study is therefore able to distinguish grievances mobilized by all successful populist right parties from those only mobilized by some parties in some countries.
In what follows, the theory section discusses the role of grievance models in explanations of party system evolution generally before outlining the three competing grievance mobilization models in the literature on the populist right. In the empirical section, the five grievance mobilization propositions arrived at in the theory section are tested on data from the seven countries that had successful populist right parties around 2002, Austria, Denmark, Flanders 2 , France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland.
The concluding section discusses how the results of these tests differ from those in previous work, and the implications of the findings for future work on the populist right.
The role of grievance mobilization models in party system evolution.
All existing theories of party system evolution, be they inspired by the Downsean economic tradition or the political sociology tradition of Lipset and Rokkan, agree on one point (Downs, 1957; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) . They implicitly or explicitly argue that unless there is some sort of societal change that gives rise to a widespread public grievance, a major change in the party system is unlikely to occur. 3 Thus, in the most detailed explanation yet of the pattern of party systems evolution in Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan emphasized the intimate connections between grievances, the expansion of suffrage, and the rise of new parties. Analyzing political development through a different lens, Downs argued that new grievances-or as he put it, changes in "the distribution of voters"-were "among the most important political events possible" (1957, p. 140) . Such changes could, in Downs' account, cause old parties to alter their behavior, they might cause the number of parties in equilibrium to change, or even cause new parties to replace the old ones (p. 125; p. 139).
Putting to work this broadly accepted notion that party system change is likely to be associated with the rise of new grievances, many scholars embraced Inglehart's post-materialism argument (1977) as a likely explanation for the rise of green parties in Western Europe. In a time of peace and prosperity, it was argued, caring for the environment and the beauty of one's own surroundings increased in importance to voters.
Therefore, a part of this literature claims, green parties, which spoke directly to new and widespread concerns about the environment, experienced success across the rich and peaceful countries of the world (Dalton, Flanagan & Beck, 1984; Pogunkte, 1987) .
Likewise, and as will be discussed in detail below, many studies of the populist right in
Western Europe have focused on identifying the grievance mobilized by these parties.
However, unlike for the green parties, the correct model is much disputed.
Grievance models emphasizing economic changes.
Western Europe experienced important economic changes from the mid 1980s and onwards. Old fashioned industries declined, while the service sector grew (Iversen, 2001 ). The lessons drawn from the experience of stagflation in the 1970s, alongside high unemployment, and an aging population created a widespread welfare crisis, which was followed by various unpopular measures of welfare retrenchment (Pierson, 1994; Offe, 1984 ). An ideology of new public management spurred, among other things, a frenzy of privatizations (Suleiman, 2003; Hood, 1998) . Most importantly, new technology, cheaper travel, and political efforts to lower trade barriers created more opportunities for businesses to relocate and opened up previously shielded industries to international competition (Held, 1999) . This process of internationalization was of course most pronounced within the EU, where integration deepened and widened in this period (Stone Sweet, Sandholz & Fligstein, 2001; Scharpf, 1999) .
Grievance models that place primary importance on economic changes therefore have many reasons for doing so. They argue that these economic changes produced realignments in the electorate which favored populist right parties with a certain appeal (Kitschelt, 1995; Betz, 1994; Esping-Andersen, 1999) . Kitschelt identified the appeal likely to win the populist right the largest amount of votes as right-authoritarian. This 'winning formula' consisted in his account of a combination of two policy appealsright-wing, neo-liberal economic policies, on the one hand, and authoritarian and nationalist socio-cultural policies, on the other.
One grievance model that places primary importance on economic changes therefore suggests that for a populist right party to succeed, it needs to successfully mobilize voters that prefer right-wing economic policies. This argument gives rise to the following empirically testable proposition:
P1: Successful populist right parties attract voters who prefer right-wing economic policies.
If we find that proposition 1 is true, then those populist right parties that failed may have done so because of an inadequate policy formula. This is indeed what Kitschelt suggested when he argued that given the right context a populist right party is only likely to succeed "provided it finds the winning formula to attract right-authoritarian support, namely a resolutely market liberal stance on economic issues and an authoritarian and particularist stance on ... [socio-cultural] questions" (Kitschelt, 1995, p. 275, original emphasis).
Many scholars studying the populist right have disagreed with Kitschelt's argument that right-wing economic policies are a necessary part of the successful populist right's appeal (Mudde, 2000; Lubbers, 2001; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Carter, 2005) , but some have still agreed with his emphasis on economic grievances. Studies in this vein, argue that voters vote for the populist right not because they prefer neo-liberal economic policies, but because they are frustrated with the economic changes taking place in their country (Betz 1994; Andersen, 1992; Esping-Andersen, 1999 ).
According to this type of economic grievance argument, voters do not vote for the populist right because their economic policies have a special appeal. Instead, they vote for the populist right-an opposition party par excellence-to express their unhappiness with the economic situation in their country. The following empirically testable proposition can be derived from this strand of economic grievance arguments:
P2: Successful populist right parties attract voters who are dissatisfied with their country's economy.
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The argument leading to proposition 2, holds that the motive for voting for the populist right contains an element of protest. In this context, however, the protest vote is conceptualized differently from studies that argue that protest voting entails weak correspondence between policy preferences and party policies (Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000; Brug & Fennema, 2003) . 5 The literature that inspired the above proposition, by contrast, suggests that populist right parties are likely to be successful only when they also extend their appeal beyond policies and tap into a more general unhappiness with economic changes. As argued by Brug and colleagues, determining the extent to which the vote for the populist right is primarily policy or primarily protest oriented is, however, an important question in and of itself, and the analysis presented here will also speak to that debate.
Grievance models emphasizing political disillusionment.
Western Europe not only went through significant economic change in the 1980s and 1990s, the region also experienced important political changes. Most of these changes were related to the furthering of European integration, which by a significant part of the public was seen as an elite driven project marred by democratic deficit and corruption.
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Alongside the deepening and widening of EU integration, governments engaged in more international cooperation, which to some citizens appeared to remove political power away from the national arena and democratic accountability (Held 1999). In addition, several Western European countries, for instance Italy, Britain, Belgium, and Germany, experienced large political corruption scandals in the 1990s, which further undermined the public's faith in their politicians (Della Porta & Mény, 1997).
These political changes and events, some suggest, have created a grievance against contemporary politicians, which benefits some or all outsider parties such as the populist right (Bergh, 2004; Rydgren, 2005; Abedi, 2002; Kitschelt, 1995) . Note that P3 and P4 do not necessarily measure the same thing, since it has been argued quite convincingly, that people who distrust their own government may be more inclined to trust EU institutions and vice-versa (Rohrschneider, 2002; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000) .
The extent to which populist right parties mobilize one or both of these types of disillusionment is in the end an empirical question, which will be addressed in this paper.
A final hypothesis belonging under this heading holds that populist right parties mobilize a backlash against the postmaterialist green movement of the educated classes (Inglehart, 1997; Kitschelt, 1995) . According to this argument, a part of the population thinks that the focus on environmentalism has gone too far. They think gasoline has become too expensive and that industries are hurting because of too restrictive environmental policies. According to this logic, the populist right succeeds when it manages to mobilize the backlash against the green movement. The empirically testable proposition, which follows from this argument, can be formulated in the following way:
P5: Successful populist right parties attract voters that think political intervention to protect the environment is unnecessary.
Grievance models emphasizing concerns over immigration. The increase in immigration, and the integration problems which came in its wake, is seen by most students of the populist right as a source of grievances that created opportunities for the populist right (see especially, Sniderman, Peri, Fiueiredo & Piazza, 2000; Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2000; Brug & Fennema, 2003; Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004) . However, several studies are also careful to point out that the populist right are not single-issue parties (Mudde, 2000; Lubbers, 2001; Gibson, 2002; Carter, 2005) .
The argument holding that rising populist right parties appealed to the public's concern over the immigration crisis lead to the sixth and last proposition:
P6: Successful populist right parties attract voters who wanted more restrictive immigration and asylum policies.
Case selection.
For both substantive and statistical reasons, this study examines the vote for the parties that (1) were commonly identified in the previous literature as belonging to the populist right; and that (2) achieved at least five percent of the vote in the previous national election. The first selection criterion is chosen to facilitate as direct a debate as possible with previous research. Put simply, this study is about those parties that the disagreement in the previous literature concerns. Since previous accounts are not in complete agreement about the parties to be described as the populist right, the analysis to follow is structured in such a way that it allows us to identify outliers or 'misfits'. 7 The second criterion is chosen since this seems a reasonable minimum threshold for electoral success in multiparty democracies, and since setting the bar any lower than five percent would not make the statistical inferences below reliable. Nord, which is considered a rising populist right party in the majority of the literature,
was not an electorally successful populist right party at the time period studied.
Data and empirical tests.
As was discussed in the introduction, the ESS is ideally suited for the task at hand since it includes all Western European countries and it contains indicators enabling us to test all the propositions discussed above. 8 Importantly, the survey asked specific questions about economic policy preferences, on the one hand, and asylum and immigration policy preferences, on the other. We therefore do not have to assume that respondents' placements on a left-right axis reflect their economic policy preferences. While using the left-right self-placement is sometimes useful, we want to avoid this indicator in the analysis presented here since we do not know which preferences this placement stands for in the eyes of any given individual in any given country at any give time.
Two different tests will be presented. Results.
The results to be presented are unwieldy, since we have estimated seven multivariate multinomial probit models with 3 or 4 party options on the dependent variable.
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Therefore, to facilitate interpretation and discussion, the complete multivariate regression results will not be presented in a country by country fashion in the following sections.
Instead, coefficients will be compared following a thematic logic. The test-statistics for each multivariate regression (i.e. each country), constants, and the number of observations are reported in the appendix alongside question wording.
Results for economic grievance models.
The results from the tests of the propositions derived from grievance models emphasizing economic changes are presented in table 1. The table shows that economic grievances were not mobilized better by all populist right parties than by all major parties. We do however find that the extent to which successful populist right parties mobilized economic grievances varies greatly across countries, and that our conclusions depend strongly on the type of major party we contrast the populist right to.
[Insert table 1 about here]
The upper part of table 1 shows that in most countries one or both of the major parties of the right mobilized voters preferring right-wing economic policies better than the populist right party. This was the case in Denmark, Flanders, France, the Netherlands, and Norway. In the two remaining countries, Austria and Switzerland, the populist right party was as good as the major right parties at mobilizing voters with rightwing economic preferences. In no country did the populist right mobilize economically right-wing voters significantly better than both major parties of the right. We may therefore conclude that populist right parties could be successful without mobilizing voters with right-wing economic preferences.
The lower part of table 1 shows that electorally successful populist right parties were not particularly good at mobilizing dissatisfaction with the national economy. In all countries studied, at least one of the major parties did as good a job as the successful populist right party at mobilizing such voters. However, in no country did any of the major parties do a better job than the populist right parties either. Mobilizing dissatisfaction with the national economy therefore helped some populist right parties in some countries gain votes, but populist right parties could be successful without mobilizing these voters.
Results for political disillusionment models.
The results of the tests of the propositions derived from the grievance model that emphasized political disillusionment are presented in table 2. The table shows that, while highly influential in many cases, neither disillusionment with politicians, nor lack of trust in the European Parliament, nor opposition to the green agenda were mobilized better by all successful populist right parties than by the major parties of the left and right. We notice significant cross-country variations in the pattern, and our conclusions depend very much on which major party we contrast the populist right to.
[Insert table 2 about here]
The top part of table two shows that the electoral outcome for populist right parties in Flanders, France, the Netherlands, and Norway was clearly improved by mobilization of distrust of politicians. However, on the whole, populist right parties mobilized such distrust better than only half of the major parties studied. Only in Norway did the populist right party successfully mobilize distrust better than all major parties. In Switzerland, by contrast, the major party of the left, the Social Democratic Party, mobilized distrust in politicians better than the populist right party. While it therefore is evident from table two that several successful populist right parties improved their electoral performance by mobilizing distrust of politicians, it was possible for populist right parties to be successful without mobilizing such grievances. 3 show that no populist right party was successful without mobilizing grievances over the immigration crisis better than all major parties of the left and right. There is, however, considerable variation across countries regarding how much better populist right parties mobilized such grievances. We also see variation in how much better populist right parties mobilized these preferences depending on party contrasts. However, the main finding is that no populist right party managed to receive more than five percent of the vote in the previous national election without mobilizing grievances over immigration better than all major parties.
[Insert table 3 about here]
Moreover, table 3 shows that the populist right parties that performed best in the preceding elections-the Swiss SVP, the French FN, and the Dutch LPF-were among the parties which most successfully mobilized grievances over immigration. The party that experienced the least success in the previous election, the Austrian FPÖ, was the party least successful at mobilizing immigration policy grievances.
Generally speaking, table 3 shows that populist right parties across Western
Europe were considerably more successful at mobilizing immigration grievances when contrasted with the major parties of the left and less so when contrasted with major parties of the right. The coefficient for the contrast with the major party of the left is considerably larger than the contrast for at least one of the major parties of the right in Denmark, Flanders, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. We do not see this pattern
in Austria and in Norway.
Comparing the results.
The graphs in figure 1 show that also in a pooled analysis, the immigration mobilization model best accounts for the vote for the successful populist right. Unlike the results in the previous sections, results similar to these are quite well known from previous work on the populist right (Anderson, 1996; Lubbers, 2001; Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2000; Gibson, 2002; Norris, 2005) . The graphs depict how the probability of voting for the Disillusionment with politicians is not significantly associated with the populist right vote in the pooled analysis. While being useful for summary interpretation, figure 1 does however not show that grievances over elitism and the economy were less consistently related to the vote for successful populist right parties across countries than were grievances over immigration. To establish this, the more detailed analysis of the previous sections was needed.
Conclusion.
This study asked us to revisit the long ongoing debate about what unites populist right parties in Western Europe. On the theoretical level, it was argued that the various competing grievance mobilization propositions suggested in the literature were on the face of it all plausible, since they highlighted cross-national trends that occurred at a time that coincided with the rise to political influence of several populist right parties.
In the empirical sections, however, this study showed that only one of these grievances-the one over immigration-was consistently mobilized by all successful populist right parties. The other two grievance mobilization models-over economic changes and elitist and corrupt politics-contributed to the explanation of the populist right vote in some countries. However, populist right parties also performed well electorally without mobilizing these grievances.
This study therefore to a large extent settles the debate about which grievances unite all populist right parties. The answer is the grievances arising from Europe's ongoing immigration crisis. Previous literature has also pointed out that the immigration issue is central to the appeal of all populist right parties. The finding of the centrality of the immigration issue is however more comprehensive in this study. Most importantly, this study shows that mobilization of grievances over economic changes and political elitism and corruption play a less consistent part in the electoral performance of populist right parties across countries than do grievances over immigration. This was not previously known.
In settling this debate, the study not only highlights the close connection between the immigration crisis and the contemporary party systems instability in Western Europe.
It also throws light on the much debated role of the protest vote in this regard. In a detailed examination of the populist right vote, this study found that all the variables that can be thought of as protest measures were less consistently related to the populist right vote than the policy measure concerning immigration. Yet significant protest components were found in some countries, most notably in Flanders, the Netherlands, and Norway. This study suggests therefore that the existing disagreement about the role of the protest vote in the electoral success of populist right parties persists because of the highly variable impact of protest mobilization on the populist right vote across countries.
This variable impact contrasts with the highly consistent impact of the policy-oriented concern over immigration.
The potential for variability in the impact of these grievances not only across countries but also over time means that the conclusions of this study are limited to the time point for which we have data, i.e. 2002/3. Since this is quite late in the career for six of the seven populist right parties studied-the exception being Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands-this study does not tell us about why populist right parties emerged. It is possible that for such a party to experience its electoral breakthrough a broader mobilization effort was necessary. Adding a hypothesis to the debate about the breakthrough of populist right parties, however, the findings of this study suggest that such broadened appeals may not have been necessary and that they at the very least need not have been the same across countries.
While adding to the existing literature the insight that only the immigration issue unifies an otherwise heterogeneous group of populist right parties, this study leaves the important question of why there were many countries without successful populist right parties in Western Europe to other studies. Existing research using aggregate data have brought us some way towards answering this question, but their results on, for example, the role of electoral systems are largely incomparable because they have not agreed on how to select cases (Norris, 2005; Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005; Carter, 2005; Golder, 2003a; 2003b; Jackman & Volpert 1996) .
Indirectly contributing to this related debate, this study provides comprehensive and detailed evidence to support a specific way of selecting cases. In short, the results presented here imply that future studies would be well advised to identify all parties that sought to mobilize grievances over immigration and explain why some of these parties managed to successfully do so, while others did not. In this effort, future researchers cannot rely on surveys alone but need perhaps to turn to studies of party programs and media reports. 14 As is seen in appendix 1, the operationalization of the green politics measure is not ideal, although it is the best measure available in the survey. Our confidence that the chosen measure gets at relevant environmental policy grievances is strengthened in that the measure does predict green party voting in separate tests conducted. 15 These predictions are based upon the results of a binomial logit model using country dummies and robust standard errors. The dependent variable is binary (vote for the populist right-not vote for the populist right). The full results of this model are available from the author upon request.
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